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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—COMMERCE CLAUSE—IN ENACTING THE
FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO CLINIC ENTRANCES ACT , WHOSE STATUTORY
DAMAGES P ROVISION SHOULD BE INTERPRETED ON A P ER VIOLATION
BASIS, CONGRESS ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ITS COMMERCE P OWER
AND DID NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT —United States v. Gregg,
226 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2000).
Congress enacted the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
(FACE) in 1994 to combat violence directed at providers of reproductive
health services. United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 2000)
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000)). The statute provides for the criminal
prosecution of protesters who use actual force, or the threat of force, to
“injure, intimidate or interfere” with persons seeking access to reproductive
health services. Id. at 257. The statute also confers standing on the U.S.
Attorney General or any injured party to sue protesters for civil remedies.
Id. at 258.
After a series of blockade protests at an abortion clinic in Englewood,
New Jersey, the Newark office of the U.S. Attorney General filed a
complaint in U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey on April 18, 1997,
naming thirty abortion protesters as defendants under FACE’s civil action
provision. Id. at 256. The Attorney General’s office sought injunctive
relief and statutory damages that were available under the statute. The
district court, after a preliminary evidentiary hearing, granted an injunction
against the defendants’ protest activities. On December 11, 1998, the
district court entered a final order holding the defendants liable for
violating FACE with their blockade protests and granting the Attorney
General’s summary judgment motion. However, the court adopted the
defendants’ interpretation of the statutory damages provision and assessed
damages of five thousand dollars per violation jointly and severally among
the defendants, not per defendant as the government had argued. The
Attorney General appealed the district court’s interpretation of the statutory
damages provision. Id. at 257. Eight defendants filed a cross appeal
contending that: (1) the Attorney General did not have the option to elect
statutory damages and was limited to actual damages, (2) Congress did not
have the power to enact FACE under its commerce power, and (3) FACE
infringed the defendants’ First Amendment free speech protections.
Circuit Judge Oakes, sitting by designation and writing for a twomember majority of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
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Circuit, held that FACE assigned damages per violation, with joint and
several liability attaching to each violator. Id. at 260. The majority also
held that Congress acted within its commerce power in enacting FACE,
and that the statute did not regulate speech protected under the First
Amendment. Id. at 262, 267.
Beginning its analysis, the court first turned to the proper
interpretation of FACE’s statutory damages provision. Id. at 257. The
court looked to the canon of statutory interpretation that holds if a statute’s
plain meaning is apparent, resort to other modes of statutory construction is
unnecessary. Id. The court described the plain meaning inquiry as twopronged: First the court must consider the express language of the statute,
and then, to discern Congress’s intent, the court must look to the legislative
history and climate at the time of the statute’s enactment. Id. The court
found the express la nguage of the FACE statute to be unequivocal. Id. at
258. The court cited Congress’s use of the term “per violation” in the
statutory damages provision of § 248(c)(1)(B) and contrasted the use of the
“per violation” language with the permissive civil penalty subsection of the
statute, where Congress used the terminology “against each respondent.”
Id. Finding the “dichotomy of expression” to be persuasive, the court held
that Congress clearly intended statutory damages to be assessed per
violation, with joint and several liability attaching to each defendant who
engaged in the violation. Id. (citing United States v. Gregg, 32 F. Supp. 2d
151, 160 (1998)).
The court likewise dismissed the Attorney General’s argument that
the use of the term “whoever” at the beginning of the statute conveyed
Congress’s intent to hold each defendant responsible for five thousand
dollars in statutory damages. Id. at 259. The court again referred to the
“per violation” language in the applicable provision, and found that its use
clearly overcame any prior reference in the statute. Id.
The court bolstered its interpretative analysis with an examination of
FACE’s legislative history and climate at the time the statute was passed.
Id. Judge Oakes cited extensive congressional findings that described a
“campaign of violence” directed at clinics, which had resulted in numerous
deaths, casualties, and arrests nationwide. Id. The court also noted
evidence that federal law enforcement was needed to remedy the failings of
state and local authorities on this issue. Id. From this history, the court
summarized the purpose of FACE as two-fold: to provide a remedy to
compensate persons and clinics that have been harmed, and also to serve as
a deterrent to would-be protesters. Id.
The majority next rejected an argument by the Attorney General that
Congress intended the court to levy statutory damages on an individual
basis to serve the deterrent function. Id at 259-60. In finding the statute a
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sufficient deterrent as interpreted, the court pointed to the other options for
penalty within the statute, including punitive damages, criminal liability,
and permissive civil penalties. Id. at 259 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 248(b) & (c)
(2000)). Judge Oakes asserted that the statutory damages provision is a
substitute for actual damages, thereby abrogating the difficulty in proving
actual harm. Id. The majority propounded that the grant of statutory
damages should not be based on how many violators participated in the
violation, but on the violation itself, since an action for actual damages
would only be able to recover on a per violation basis, not per defendant.
Id.
Judge Oakes next considered the Attorney General’s argument that a
“per violation” interpretation of the statute would encourage defendants to
act en masse. Id. at 260. The court found this argument unpersuasive,
reasoning that because the statute contained a variety of remedies, a
prospective violator could not know if he faced an even more serious
penalty than statutory damages, such as criminal prosecution. Id. Judge
Oakes observed that this uncertainty preserved the statute’s deterrent value,
even with joint and several liability for the five thousand-dollar statutory
damages attached. Id.
Turning to the defendants’ contention that the Attorney General could
only pursue recovery for actual damages and not statutory damages, the
court considered whether attorneys general were free to pursue the same
statutory damages available to private plaintiffs. Id. The majority, looking
to the express language of FACE, held that the Attorney General was free
to pursue statutory damages as a matter of right since the statute gave
attorneys general standing to sue for “compensatory damages.” Id. (citing
18 U.S.C. § 248 (c)(2)(B) (2000)). Noting that a prior subsection had
clearly defined compensatory damages as “actual and statutory damages,”
the court interpreted this definition, as well as the legislative history, as
persuasive evidence of Congress’s intent to allow attorneys general to
choose statutory damages in lieu of actual damages. Id. at 260-61 (citing
18 U.S.C. § 248 (c)(1)(B) (2000)).
Judge Oakes next contemplated the defendants’ claim that FACE was
an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s commerce power under the
Constitution. Id. at 261 (citing U.S. CONST . art. I, § 8, cl. 3). The court,
observing that it would be one of the last federal courts of appeal to weigh
in on this issue, noted that seven other circuit courts had upheld the
statute’s constitutionality under the Commerce Clause, as well as several
instances in which the U.S. Supreme Court had denied certiorari of the
issue. Id. (citations omitted). The court, noting that congressional action
was due substantial deference by the court, held that FACE was a proper
exercise under the Commerce Clause. Id.
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Judge Oakes, beginning the constitutional analysis, identified the
Supreme Court’s recent opinions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995), and United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000), as the
pertinent sources for Commerce Clause interpretative guidance. Id. at 26162. Using a rational basis standard, the court asserted that FACE is “a
proper exercise of Congress’s power to regulate intrastate conduct that, in
the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.” Id. at 262.
The court elaborated, citing Morrison as providing the proper framework
for deciding whether a statute regulates an activity that has the necessary
“substantial effect” on interstate commerce. Id. Circuit Judge Oakes
described the four factors Morrison presented for the court’s consideration
as (1) whether the activity is economic or commercial in nature, (2)
whether the statute includes a “jurisdictional element,” (3) whether
Congress has provided express findings in support of the regulation, and
(4) whether there is a sufficient connection between interstate commerce
and the regulated activity. Id. at 262-63 (citing Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at
1751).
Applying the Morrison factors to FACE, the court found that the
statute satisfied the first factor. Id. at 262. The court provided several
arguments as to how the provision of reproductive health services is an
economic activity, involving a staff, customer base, and supplies, for
example. Id. Illegal protests, the court noted, had caused millions of
dollars of damage to providers and had prevented many care-seekers from
receiving treatment, and thus had an effect on the commercial activity of
the clinics when viewed in broad terms. Id. The court distinguished FACE
from the Violence Against Women Act, the statute found unconstitutional
in Morrison, holding that FACE regulates misconduct that has an economic
effect. Id.
Continuing, the court turned to the second Morrison consideration,
whether FACE contains a jurisdictional element. Id. at 263. Though
FACE did not contain an explicit jurisdictional element, the court held that
this shortcoming was not necessarily fatal. Id. (citing United States v. Bird,
124 F.3d 667, 672-82 (5th Cir. 1997)).
Judge Oakes, continuing to the third factor, found that Congress had
sufficiently documented a need for the statute with extensive findings. Id.
Finally, the court contemplated the fourth Morrison factor: whether
Congress had a rational basis to conclude that the behavior FACE regulated
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. Judge Oakes, in
finding a substantial effect on commerce, cited the extensive findings of
Congress that clinic violence and intimidation had the effect of preventing
access to reproductive health services. Id. Specifically, the court noted
that clinic violence contributed to a shortage of doctors, making it difficult
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for many women to seek reproductive health services. Id. at 263-64. The
majority opined that the market for abortion services was national in
nature, since both patients and doctors were known to travel interstate in
order to participate in the service, which also indic ated that the clinics, like
many other businesses, were part of the “stream” of interstate commerce.
Id. at 264.
Judge Oakes, acknowledging another of Congress’s findings,
observed that the pattern of violence against clinics was part of a national
movement, having a detrimental national effect on the availability of health
care. Id. The court highlighted recent incidents of clinic violence, and the
resultant negative effects on abortion service availability in communities
where such violence had occurred. Id. The court held that this evidence,
taken as a whole, established that Congress had a rational basis to find that
clinic violence had a substantial and direct effect on interstate commerce.
Id. at 264-66. The court pointed to the functionality test of Jones v. United
States, 120 S. Ct. 1904 (2000), claiming that clinic protests were analogous
to the arson of a commercial building, which the case had cited as an
example of a sufficiently commerce-affecting activity. Id. at 266. Judge
Oakes also likened the activity regulated by FACE to that in Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), where the Court found
that discrimination in local restaurants had an adverse effect on interstate
commerce. Id. In light of these precedents, the court concluded that FACE
was a “legitimate regulation of activity having a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.” Id. at 267.
The court next rejected the defendants’ First Amendment claim,
joining numerous other courts of appeals that have upheld FACE against
freedom of expression challenges. Id. The court rebuffed the defendants’
claim that FACE was an unconstitutional viewpoint-based speech
restriction. Id. Judge Oakes propounded that the statute governed all
persons equally, without regard to the motivation for their actions, and was
thus not viewpoint-based at all. Id. The majority held that FACE governs
conduct, not speech, and Congress did not seek to discriminate against the
protestors’ anti-abortion message. Id. Though acknowledging that the
regulated activity might have “expressive components,” Judge Oakes
asserted that government regulation was still appropriate since the statute
met the requirements of strict scrutiny, as well as satisfied the three-part
test for conduct with an expressive component found in United States v.
O’Brien 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Id. at 268. The court affirmed the district
court’s ruling, rejecting the defendant’s claim that FACE violated the First
Amendment. Id.
Judge Weis, in a dissenting opinion, argued that FACE did not survive
constitutional scrutiny.
Id. at 268 (Weis, J., dissenting).
While
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acknowledging that seven circuit courts had found FACE constitutional,
Judge Weis noted that several of those decisions had come over the
objections of dissenting judges who had argued FACE did not satisfy
Lopez’s requirements. Id. Judge Weis also claimed that after Morrison,
the Commerce Clause analysis of Lopez was necessarily strengthened, so
the majority’s narrow reading of the Lopez holding was inappropriate. Id.
at 269 (Weis, J., dissenting). The dissent charged that under this
strengthened analysis, FACE did not have a substantial impact on interstate
commerce and should be held unconstitutional. Id. Judge Weis suggested
that the majority ignored the significance of these two Supreme Court
cases, which was that Congress had limited authority to federalize local
crime statutes under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 269-70 (Weis, J.,
dissenting).
Judge Weis analogized FACE to the statutes found
unconstitutional in Lopez (Gun-Free School Zones Act) and Morrison
(Violence Against Women Act [VAWA]), noting that all three statutes
governed crimes typically regulated by the states, and each had an
insufficient nexus with commercial activity. Id. at 270 (Weis, J.,
dissenting) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
The dissent then analyzed FACE using Morrison’s four factors for
reviewing whether Congress is constitutionally permitted to regulate an
activity having a substantial impact on interstate commerce. Id. at 270-71
(Weis, J., dissenting). In contrast to the majority, which found the factors
satisfied, the dissent took issue with each of the four factors, finding that in
enacting FACE Congress had overextended its authority to regulate
interstate commerce. Id. Addressing the first factor, the dissent stressed
that while abortion providers clearly provide a commercial service, the
activities regulated by the statute, the protests, were not commercial in
nature. Id. at 270 (Weis, J., dissenting). While acknowledging that clinic
violence does have some economic impact, the dissent emphasized that the
court must examine the conduct FACE regulates and focus on its police
power character, not any incidental economic effects. Id. Judge Weis
propounded that not every activity with an economic impact is a
commercial activity. Id.. Judge Weis distinguished Heart of Atlanta Motel
from the present case, noting that the civil rights laws at issue regulated
economic entities themselves, not the possible commercial conduct of third
parties. Id. at 270-71 (Weis, J., dissenting).
Turning to Morrison’s second factor, the dissent argued that the lack
of a jurisdictional element was a fatal flaw that could not be overcome by
any amount of congressional findings. Id. at 271 (Weis, J., dissenting).
Judge Weis declared that a jurisdictional element was needed to ensure that
the government could only invoke the statute with proof that interstate
commerce was indeed being affected. Id. The dissent maintained that this

MAROULAKOS SURVEY FORMATTED.DOC

298

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

2/7/2001 11:44 AM

[Vol. 31:292

lack of jurisdictional element creates a statute that is too broad in scope,
unconstitutionally allowing federal intervention into purely local matters.
Id.
Analyzing the third factor, Judge Weis criticized the majority’s
reliance on legislative findings, arguing that Morrison held that deference
to congressional findings could not take the place of a judicial inquiry into
whether the effect on interstate commerce was substantial. Id. at 272
(Weis, J., dissenting). The dissent also found the findings themselves
suspect, arguing that the alleged economic effects were not proximate
enough to be correctly attributed to clinic violence. Id.
Finally, the dissent discussed Morrison’s fourth factor of whether
there was a sufficient link between the regulated activity and interstate
commerce, and concluded that any supposed link between clinic protests
and commerce was too attenuated. Id. at 272-73 (Weis, J., dissenting).
The dissent reasoned that the economic activities cited by the majority—
the purchase of supplies and operation of a business, for example —were
not enough to transform the regulated activity from a local concern into a
national problem. Id. The dissent also chastised the majority for finding
state treatment of the problem inadequate, and concluded by lambasting
Congress for federalizing local criminal law outside the limits of the
Commerce Clause. Id. at 273-74 (Weis, J., dissenting). Judge Weis
concluded by noting that in addition to being unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause, FACE should also be held unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment, since there is no requisite state action. Id. at 275
(Weis, J., dissenting).
The court’s interpretative analysis of the statutory damages question
correctly weighed congressional intent as part of a plain meaning inquiry,
and achieved an equitable result for plaintiffs and defendants: ensuring a
remedy, but not one beyond what the legislature had in mind. In disposing
of the constitutional challenge, the court has acted unsurprisingly in
aligning itself with seven other circuit courts in finding FACE a
constitutional exercise of Congress’s commerce power. However, the court
has undervalued a significant constitutional development that occurred
after those cases were decided: the Supreme Court’s opinion in United
States v. Morrison. The majority echoes Justice Souter’s dissent in
Morrison, calling for a deferential, rational basis review of congressional
findings as part of the “substantial effects” inquiry. However, the majority
in Morrison rejected this standard of review, and determined that the
judiciary’s role was not to rubber-stamp Congress’s findings, but rather to
independently consider the question of whether there were indeed
substantial effects on interstate commerce.
The majority in Gregg appears to be making an independent inquiry
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into Congress’s authority to enact FACE, but is in actuality incorrectly
framing the issue. The activity the statute regulates is not the commercial
activity of a reproductive health clinic, but is the criminal activity of
protestors.
This framing problem, combined with the lack of a
jurisdictional element, makes FACE too similar to the VAWA examined
in Morrison to survive constitutional scrutiny. While well intentioned, and
seemingly effective legislation, FACE cannot be maintained as a proper
exercise of Congress’s commerce power after Morrison.
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